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Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been
described as thoughts about oneself as oneself. In recent years, various theoret-
ical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system
does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, appa-
rently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate
a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se
thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism.
1
Since Russell onward to the current debate between descriptivism and singular-
ism,¹ which involves both philosophy of mind and language, the intuitive differ-
ence between descriptive thoughts about a particular object or individual (e.g.
“The strongest man in the world can lift 150 kg”) and the so-called non-descrip-
tive or de re thoughts (e.g. “that man is drunk”), based on a relationship of ac-
quaintance, can be immediately grasped on account of the different nature and
role of the respective modes of presentation in play.² Based on a reconsideration
of Russell’s notion of acquaintance through Evans’s neo-Fregean lesson, which
explicitly takes into account non-descriptive modes of presentation, in de re
thoughts the individual or object to which the thought refers is determined by
a demonstrative mode of presentation specified through a relation of informa-
tion-perception linking the object with the occurrence of the thought.³
Descriptive representations represent their referents through the properties
they instantiate, their reference being determined by the existence of whatever
may satisfy such properties. Instead, non-descriptive representations represent
their referents through a contextual relation linking the occurrence of a thought
with the object at issue. In this context, and due to their indexical nature, non-
 New Essays on Singular Thought. Ed. Robin Jeshion. Oxford 2010.
 Bach, Kent: Thought and Reference. Oxford 1987.
 Recanati, François: De re and De se. In: Dialectica, 63/3 (2009), 249–269, 252.
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descriptive representations are token-reflexive and, as such, present two semantic
levels.
Resuming Frege’s idea that “every one is presented to himself in a particular
and primitive way, in which he is presented to no one else”,⁴ Perry and Recanati
describe de se thoughts as special cases of de re thoughts.⁵ A de se thought is
nothing but a de re thought whose object is the same thinking subject who
has produced the thought at issue; this type of thought rests on a special relation
of acquaintance between the subject and its own self through a first-person mode
of presentation, referred to by Recanati as EGO mode of presentation, and by
Perry as self files, i.e. the mental particular by which the subject acquires first-
person information. Obviously, one may also formulate accidental de se
thoughts, namely de re thoughts about oneself involving neither first-person
mode of presentation nor awareness that the subject to whom its thought is re-
ferring is the subject itself. Castañeda, Kaplan and Perry’s examples are well-
known.
According to Recanati, (a) de re thoughts may concern (a.1) someone other
than oneself or (a.2) oneself. In the latter case, i.e. with de se thoughts, these
can be either (a.2.1) accidental or (a.2.2) genuine, also widely referred to as I-
thoughts. In turn, genuine de se thoughts can be (a.2.2.1) explicit and grounded
on an identification component, once again explicitly represented in thought, as
in Kaplan’s example of a subject who identifies himself in a mirror with the man
whose pants are on fire.
De se thoughts may also be implicit and based on identification-free self-ref-
erence. As such, they are immune to error through misidentification relative to first
person, as opposed to thoughts involving an explicit self-identification.⁶ Several
 Frege, Gottlob: The Thought: a Logical Enquiry. In: Philosophical Logic. Ed. Peter F. Strawson.
Oxford 1967, 17–38, 25 f.
 Perry, John: Thought without Representation. In: Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 60 (1986), 137–152. Perry, John: Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self. Indianapolis
2002.
 Due to the absence of identification components, some singular judgments involving self-as-
criptions of mental and physical properties are immune to error through misidentification relative
to the first-person pronoun. The subject formulating such judgments in given epistemic contexts
cannot be mistaken as to whether it is she who is attributing a particular property to her own
self. The issue is introduced by Wittgenstein – The Blue and the Brown Books. Oxford 1958,
66 f. – in his philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I: here he dis-
tinguishes two uses, the use as object (“I have grown six inches”), and the use as subject (“I have
a toothache”), where no subject identification is taken into account. On this issue, see the classic
discussions by Strawson (criterionless self-ascription) – The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966, 165; Shoemaker (self-reference without identification) –
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authors, since Shoemaker onward, have observed that in this particular type of
de se thoughts, the subject is not represented as a constituent in the content of
thought, but rather serves as a circumstance of evaluation for the judgment at
issue. In other words, a de se thought does not express a complete proposition
ascribing a property to the thinking subject, but simply arises from a representa-
tional content expressing the instantiation of that property. This is to say that
thinking such a content also implies the self-ascription of the property expressed
by the content of the de se thought.
Accordingly, not all de se are de re thoughts, as this applies only to (a.2.2.1)
explicit de se thoughts; on the contrary, as just said, (b) implicit de se thoughts
do not fall under the class of de re thoughts precisely because the subject is not a
res that can be made the object of a representational relation. Therefore, the sub-
ject is not represented in the de se thought; only the properties instantiated in
the experiential dimension are.
2
Bearing in mind the different philosophical approaches, there is no doubt that
the de se thoughts perspective discussed so far is particularly attractive since
some features of transcendental apperception and I think seem to anticipate
some points of this approach, especially as regards a basic typology of implicit
de se thoughts not yet introduced in the present discussion, as will be explained
soon.
In a famous passage, Kant introduces the principle of transcendental unity of
apperception:⁷ this fragment marks the incipit of the B-Deduction and condenses
two important points for this discussion that have been widely tackled by lead-
ing commentators. The first has a more general scope and concerns single rep-
resentations: in order to represent something for a subject, the subject must
be able to think that every representation is its own. Obviously, the point here
is not that de facto representations are accompanied by the I think, but the ne-
cessity of the possibility of representation self-ascriptions. With respect to this,
Ameriks speaks of a personal quality assigned to individual representations so
that these can present the form (E): I think that x, I think that y, I think that
Self-reference and self-awareness. In: Journal of Philosophy, 65/19 (1968), 555–567; Evans, Gareth:
The Varieties of Reference. Oxford 1982, 220.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, B 131 f.
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z.⁸ Similarly, Carl speaks of the ability to make judgments from the first-person
point of view.⁹
The second point concerns the set of representations accounting for a com-
plex thought based on synthetic unity: the different representations merge into
one single consciousness as a thought ascribable to a subject, i.e. (T) I think
that (I think that x, I think that y, I think that z, etc.).¹⁰ Not only must the uses
of I be co-referential – the I thinking x must be identical to the I thinking y,
and so on – but the identity of I think must also concern the higher-ranking I
think (here outside parentheses), upon which lies the synthesis of various repre-
sentations in a single complex thought.
Taken together, these two points set up the necessary synthetic unity of ap-
perception, whereby “the components of a complex thought must be connected
in such a way as to allow for the possibility of their ascription to a single think-
ing subject, which entails that they constitute a synthetic unity”.¹¹ In this way, in
another famous excerpt, Kant asserts that the analytical unit of apperception
presupposes synthetic unity, i.e. the consciousness of the I think identity re-
quires not only a synthesis but also a consciousness of the synthesis identity.¹²
Within deduction, all this should be linked to the relations between synthe-
sis, representations and object on the one hand, and between apperception,
judgment and intellect on the other, specifying the categories as conditions of
possibility of knowledge. The intellect is the faculty of knowledge through con-
cepts, while the object is what is given through the synthesis of the manifold in
intuition on a conceptual basis. The union of representations via conceptual syn-
thesis would not exist without the unity of apperception, which refers them to a
given object in such a way as to establish their objective validity.¹³
The unification of representations should also be linked to the faculty of
judgment, seen as the faculty of applying rules, and articulated according to
the well-known distinction between objective and subjective unity of conscious-
ness. While the objective unity of consciousness presupposes the use of catego-
 Ameriks, Karl: Kant and the Self: A Retrospective. In: Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute, and
Others in Classical German Philosophy. Ed. David Klemm, Günter Zöller. New York 1997, 55–72,
58.
 Carl, Wolfgang: Apperception and spontaneity. In: International Journal of Philosophical Stud-
ies, 5/2 (1997), 147–163, 153.
 Ameriks, Karl: Kant and the Self, 58.
 Allison, Henry: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Revised and Enlarged Edition. New Haven/
London 2004, 178.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, B 134.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, B 137.
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ries and allows for the manifold given in intuition to be unified in the concept of
an object, the subjective unity of consciousness is merely a product of reproduc-
tive imagination. Kant rejects the logicians’ definition of judgment as the repre-
sentation of a relation between two concepts because it does not specify what
such a relation amounts to. It is the copula that specifies the relation of judg-
ment in terms of what links representations to the objective unity of appercep-
tion so as to convert them into objective knowledge: the act of judgment, seen
as spontaneity of the subject, is the very condition of synthesis. In this picture,
the operation of the intellect which links the representational manifold to the
unity of apperception is given by the logical function of judgments determining
the manifold in empirical intuition. Categories are functions of judgment by
which the manifold is determined; it follows that as long as the manifold is
linked to the synthetic unit within one single consciousness, it is subject to cat-
egories.
I think is, thus, the formal condition of all thinking. I designates the tran-
scendental subject, yet this subject is something general, unidentifiable from
an epistemic point of view. As a consequence, the awareness of intellectual
self-existence summarized by the I think representation accompanying every
other representation does not display any property. Due to the absence of intu-
ition, as a matter of fact it is not possible to determine whether that something
does exist as a persistent substance in order to make knowledge.¹⁴ What is being
assumed on the basis of the representation I is a mere existent devoid of any
property. The subject is able to know that it exists as a thinking activity, but
not what it is: the subject’s being is inaccessible from an epistemic point of
view, and what is given is nothing but thoughts regarded as its predicates,
which cannot enable us to grasp the thinking subject’s nature.
As a result, there emerge a few peculiarities of the self-referential apparatus
involved in transcendental apperception: the subject is designated only tran-
scendentally,¹⁵ the act of reference performed by the subject to refer to itself en-
tails no mediation of knowing; in other words, it involves no identification
through the properties ascribable to the subject.With the notion of transcenden-
tal designation, Kant anticipates some self-reference without identification fea-
tures. The condition of possibility of all judgments relies on the I think act; at
this level, the intellectual representation I is a simple representation, wholly
empty of content and solely referring to something in general, namely to a tran-
 Cf. Kant: KrV, B 157; B 278.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, A 355.
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scendental subject.¹⁶ An empty form, I designates but does not represent.¹⁷ Kant
restates this point when he holds that “I is the general correlate of apperception
designating, just as a mere prefix, a thing of undetermined meaning.”¹⁸
3
In sum, the general correlate of apperception I cannot be used to constitute a de
re thought: the transcendental subject, seen as “this I, or He, or It (the thing),
which thinks” is not a res that can be made the object of a representational re-
lation.While I think is the condition of every thought, I is no explicit representa-
tional reference within the content of a judgment: it designates only transcen-
dentally, and involves neither conceptual nor intuitional mediation. Two
related issues arise with respect to this first result.
The first concerns the relationship between I think and the articulation of de
se thoughts. If the act of spontaneity expressed by I think is necessarily involved
in the making of a judgment, then it must reside at a much more abstract level
than the reflection on the distinction between implicit and explicit de se
thoughts. The Kantian arguments on I think cannot articulate the different
types of de se thoughts expressing self-ascriptions of mental and physical prop-
erties because these regard the form and condition of possibility of any kind of
judgment, regardless of the particular uses of I (as subject or object, in Wittgen-
steinian terms) involved in the single judgments produced. In other terms, the I
think mechanism of transcendental designation cannot account for the presence
or absence of the representational reference of the subject in judgments such as
“I have grown six inches” (an explicit de se thought) or “I have a toothache” (an
implicit de se thought) since such is the condition of possibility of both.
The issue becomes different in the case of a more fundamental, implicit de
se thought. As we have seen, Recanati distinguishes implicit from explicit self-as-
criptions according to the distinction between mode of representation and con-
tent of representation. The former concern all information gained through the
proprioceptive/kinaesthetic mode: on the basis of her proprioceptive/kinaesthetic
experience, if the subject judges her legs crossed, she cannot be mistaken as to
the person to whom she ascribes the property of having her legs crossed. If the
judgment is not made from the inside, and relies on the perception of the sub-
 Cf. Kant: KrV, A 355.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, A 381.
 Kant: MAN, AA 04: 542.35–37.
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ject’s body in the mirror, she will see that her legs are crossed and may misiden-
tify the person with crossed legs. In this latter case, the subject is explicitly rep-
resented in the content of the representation, whereas in the former she is not
represented but implicitly determined by the mode. Hence, the statement is iden-
tification-free.
In spite of this difference, the author holds that the self is always an unar-
ticulated constituent, whereas every (implicit or explicit) self-ascription presup-
poses, in turn, an implicit self-ascription of the propriety of thinking. One must
therefore distinguish between a first level – in which the subjective dimension
producing a thought is not represented as the producer of that thought¹⁹ –
and a second level, where the subject can be implicitly or explicitly represented
in the content of thought as the subject to whom a given property is attributed.
Perry and Recanati’s relativist perspective articulates such two levels in compli-
ance with specific cognitive constraints, eliminating any explicit representation
of the self and eventually reaching Perry’s paradox that some de se attitudes
should be considered selfless.
On the contrary, and although reaching the same result, in Kant the role of
the I, seen as a correlative of apperception, is preserved as the basis of synthesis.
As a matter of fact, Kant’s perspective articulates these two levels according to a
distinction between two classes of self-ascriptions: those taking I as passive, and
those taking I as active.²⁰ Following Carl’s epistemological perspective,²¹ which
maps the distinction onto one between spontaneity and receptivity, while the for-
mer self-ascriptions are determined by representations given in sensibility in in-
dependent ways, the I as active is “the logical I”,²² the bearer and ground of all
judgments, the referent of all mental self-ascriptions expressing the act of judg-
ing one’s given representations.
Here arises a second issue concerning the specific and, to some extent, con-
troversial nature of the representational reference of I in judgments. On the one
hand, I think must be able to accompany every representation, whereas I desig-
nates “this I, or He, or It (the thing) which thinks” only transcendentally, without
 On this particular point, Perry – Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self, 208 – exposits the
“Tractarian or Carnapian way of making this point” holding that “the world as we perceive it
does not include ourselves, but has ourselves as sort of a point of origin”. As is well known,
this is also, and above all, a Kantian issue, resumed mutatis mutandis by Schopenhauer, and,
through him, Wittgenstein (cf. Frascolla, Pasquale: Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.
New York 2007, 204f.).
 Cf. Kant: Refl, AA 15: 80, R. 208; Kant: FM, AA 20: 270.
 Carl, Wolfgang: Apperception and spontaneity, 157.
 Kant: Anth, AA 07: 134.24f.
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the intervention of any explicit egological representational reference in the judg-
ment.
Ameriks already finds this feature in the above-mentioned first level of one’s
own, not nothing for me representations: “without any objective reflection on the
self having taken place, the state [of awareness] is structured by the form ‘I think
that x’, and therefore is already in a personal, even if implicit, sense an instance
of ‘our’ consciousness”.²³ Every thought is in itself an instance of self-awareness,
even when no subjective dimension is involved. As for the upper level concern-
ing the function of synthesis, I think–seen as the representation of an act of
spontaneity – is the bearer of all judgments which makes any thought possible.
What is more, I think is considered a simple representation: in the absence of any
identificative epistemic mediation, it merely designates the activity of thinking
transcendentally, as the nexus established by the copula in the judgment linking
the representational synthesis on a conceptual basis with the synthetic unity of
apperception.
In conclusion, to think is to unify the manifold conceptually; every thought
expressed by a judgment is necessarily based on the principle of transcendental
apperception. For this reason, Kant holds that I is implicit in the concept of
thought itself,²⁴ determining the form of every judgment in general terms.²⁵
Hence, the I of apperception, seen as a ‘logically simple subject’, is analytically
contained in the concepts of ‘thinking’ or ‘thoughts’ (des Denkens).²⁶ If I is the
subject of thinking,²⁷ and if it is not represented except in the form of the judg-
ment established by the synthetic unit of apperception, in the specific terms of
Transcendentalism every thought is an implicit de se thought.
 Ameriks, Karl: Kant and the Self, 63.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, B 132.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, B 406.
 Cf. Kant: KrV, B 407f.
 Kant: Anth, AA 07: 134.24f.
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